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Abstract
The paper o¤ers a formal model of analogical legal reasoning and takes the model
to data. Under the model, the outcome of a new case is a weighted average of the
outcomes of prior cases. The weights capture precedential inuence and depend on
fact similarity (distance in fact space) and precedential authority (position in the
judicial hierarchy). The empirical analysis suggests that the model is a plausible
model for the time series of U.S. maritime salvage cases. Moreover, the results
evince that prior cases decided by inferior courts have less inuence than prior cases
decided by superior courts.
Georgetown University, Law Center, 600 New Jersey Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001
(jct48@law.georgetown.edu). I thank Conor Larkin for his herculean research assistance. Thanks also
to the editor, two anonymous referees, Andrew Christensen, Joshua Fischman, workshop participants at
the Center in Law, Economics, and Organization at the University of Southern California Gould School
of Law, and conference participants at the 2010 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies. This paper is
based on a chapter of my doctoral dissertation at Cornell University.
1 Introduction
How do judges reason about the law? There are many theories. The canonical theory
is that judges reason by analogy from case to case (Levi 1949; Weinreb 2005). This
method of reasoning is known as analogical legal reasoning to jurisprudence scholars and
case-based legal reasoning to scholars in the eld of articial intelligence and law.1
In its purest form, analogical legal reasoning (ALR) involves reasoning directly from
prior cases to the case at hand the judge evaluates the similarities and di¤erences
between prior cases and the case at hand and reaches a decision through application
of the principle that like cases should be treated alike (Alexander and Sherwin 2008).
Notably, ALR operates without invoking a legal rule that governs the decision in the
case at hand (Sunstein 1993, 1996).2 In this way, ALR stands in contrast to rule-based
legal reasoning (RLR), which involves reasoning deductively from legal rules (Alexander
and Sherwin 2008; Schauer 2009).3 In its purest form, RLR operates without reference
to prior cases the judge simply applies the governing legal rule to the case at hand.4
ALR constitutes a "legalist" theory of judicial behavior (Posner 2008). According to
the legalist theory, "judges decide cases through systematic application of the external,
objective sources of authority that classically comprise the law" (Cross 2003).5 Although
the legalist theory is the traditional theory of judicial behavior in legal circles, it has
many critics. Perhaps the leading criticism of the legalist theory is that it su¤ers from
theoretical and empirical indeterminacy (Cross 2003). ALR has been especially targeted
by critics, with one commentator complaining that "it is infrequently described with any
rigor or care" (Alexander 1996).6
1Some commentators argue that its use of analogy makes legal reasoning a distinctive form of reasoning
(e.g., Fried 1981; Weinreb 2005). The mystical notion that legal reasoning is a distinctive form of
reasoning was famously articulated by Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice of England, who denied the
authority and competence of the King of England to render legal judgments on the grounds that legal
questions "are not to be decided by natural reason but by the articial reason and judgment of law."
Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1607).
2On the di¤erent forms of analogical legal reasoning, see generally Macagno and Walton (2009).
3See also Westen (1982), Eisenberg (1988), Posner (1990, 1995, 2006, 2008), Schauer (1991), and
Alexander (1996, 1998).
4At most, the judge uses prior cases to infer (perhaps abductively or inductively) the governing legal
rule. However, she does not reason directly from case to case.
5Of course, there are many other theories of judicial behavior. Posner (2008) identies no fewer
than nine theories, including most notably the legalist theory, the attitudinal theory, which posits that
judges decide cases according to their ideological preferences (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002), and the
economic and strategic theories, which posit that judges decide cases strategically, taking into account
the responses of other actors, to promote their ideology (e.g., Epstein and Knight 1998; Smith and Tiller
2002), enhance their reputation or career prospects (e.g., Miceli and Cos¸gel 1994; Levy 2005), or further
some other specied objective.
6Notable exceptions include Sunstein (1993, 1996), Brewer (1996), and Weinreb (2005). Alexander
(1996) also asserts that ALR is a "fantasy."
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This paper has two objectives. The rst objective is to o¤er a formal model of
ALR. The model posits that the outcome in the case at hand is a weighted average of
the outcomes of prior cases. The weight placed on the outcome of a prior case in the
weighted average captures the precedential inuence of the prior case and depends on
the fact similarity (distance in fact space) and precedential authority (position in the
judicial hierarchy) of the prior case relative to the case at hand.
The ALR model is closely related to the empirical similarity model of Gilboa et al.
(2006) and Billot et al. (2005), as well as the wider literature on case-based decision
theory.7 Case-based decision theory is a model of reasoning by analogy to past cases
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001).8 Empirical similarity theory is a closely-related model
for real-valued assessment problems. Under the empirical similarity model, new assess-
ments are made according to similarity-weighted averages of prior assessments.9 In most
applications of empirical similarity theory, the similarity function (i.e., the function that
determines the weights in the weighted average) is symmetric the inuence of a prior
case on a new case is the same as the (counterfactual) inuence of the new case on the
prior case. This is because the similarity function typically is based on a metric, usually
a weighted Euclidean metric (e.g., Gayer et al. 2007; Lieberman 2010; Gilboa et al. 2011).
In the ALR model, by contrast, the similarity function is asymmetric the inuence of
a prior case on a new case is not necessarily the same as the (counterfactual) inuence
of the new case on the prior case. This is because the similarity function is based on a
quasimetric, i.e., a function that satises the properties of a metric, apart from symme-
try. This allows the ALR model to capture an important feature of reasoning by analogy
in law, namely that precedential inuence depends not only on fact similarity, which is
symmetric, but also on precedential authority, which is not symmetric.10
7 In case-based decision theory, the term "case" is used generically; it does not refer to a legal case.
8See also Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003) and Gilboa et al. (2002). Case-
based decision theory was inspired by work on case-based reasoning in articial intelligence (Riesbeck
and Schank 1989) and harkens back to the notion that all human "reasonings concerning matter of fact
are founded on a species of Analogy" (Hume 1748).
9Empirical similarity theory is related to various methods in computer science, statistics, and related
elds, including, most notably: kernel methods (Pagan and Ullah 1999), which are commonly used
in nonparametric estimation; nearest neighbor methods (Dasarathy 1991; Devroye et al. 1996), which
are commonly used in machine learning and pattern recognition; and conditional autoregressive (CAR)
and simultaneous autoregressive (SAR) models (Banerjee et al. 2004), which are commonly used in the
analysis of areal and other spatial data. I expand upon the connection between empirical similarity theory
and kernel regression in Section 3.2. For discussions of the relationship between empirical similarity
theory, on the one hand, and nearest neighbor methods and CAR models, on the other hand, see
Lieberman (2010) and Gilboa et al. (2011).
10Lieberman (2012) and Argenziano and Gilboa (2012) also feature asymmetric similarity functions,
the former in a model of similarity-based autoregression and the latter in a model of history-dependent
belief formation in coordination games. In neither paper, however, is the similarity function asymmetric
because it depends on the authority of the prior case. In Lieberman (2012), the similarity function is
asymmetric because it depends on the direction of the change of the characteristics of a variable from
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The second objective of the paper is to take the ALR model to data. The data
comprise the time series of reported decisions by federal courts in U.S. maritime salvage
cases.11 The rst step of the empirical analysis is to embed the ALR model in a statistical
model. The next step is to assess whether the ALR model is a plausible model for the
data. I focus on two properties of the ALR model: (i) it is an autoregressive process and
(ii) the process has a unit root. To investigate whether an autoregressive process could
have generated the data, I estimate a linear regression model and test for autocorrelation
in the residuals using parametric and nonparametric tests. To investigate whether the
data has a unit root, I employ a "nearly e¢ cient" unit root test. The results suggest
that the data are consistent with an autoregressive process that has a unit root.
The nal step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the ALR model by maximum
likelihood and test the null hypothesis that the similarity function is symmetric. This is
the crucial step of the empirical analysis, as the key innovation of the ALR model, and
the papers main contribution, is the asymmetry of the similarity function. I nd that
the symmetry hypothesis is rejected at the one percent level. The implication is that
precedential authority, and not just fact similarity, matters for precedential inuence.
All else equal (namely, fact similarity), the precedential inuence of a prior case that
was decided by a inferior court is signicantly less than the precedential inuence of a
prior case that was decided by a superior court.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the ALR model.
Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. In Section 4, I discuss certain limitations of
the ALR model and the empirical analysis, as well as directions for future research.
2 The ALR Model
2.1 Legal System
Let K denote the set of judges or courts in the legal system. The courts in K are ordered
in accordance with the hierarchy of courts in the legal system. Accordingly, I sometimes
refer to K as the authority space.
Let Q denote the set of questions of law that may be presented to a court. For
each question q 2 Q, there exists a set of conclusions of law Y that a court may reach
with respect to question q. There also exists an array of issues of fact that the court
must resolve in order to reach a conclusion with respect to question q. For each issue i,
one time to the next. In Argenziano and Gilboa (2012), the similarity function is asymmetric because it
depends on the outcome of the prior game.
11 In Section 3.1, I describe the data and explain why I selected U.S. maritime salvage cases for the
empirical analysis.
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there exists a set of ndings of fact i that the court may make with respect thereto.
Accordingly, each question q 2 Q induces a fact space  = 1     n. Each element
 = (1; :::; n) 2  is a fact pattern. Given question q, the set of conclusions Y and the
fact space  are known and unique.
For example, consider the question of patentability under U.S. patent law. The
authority space K comprises the U.S. district courts (at the bottom of the hierarchy),
the U.S. courts of appeals (in the middle), and the U.S. Supreme Court (at the top).
The question of law q is whether an invention is patentable. The set of conclusions
is Y = f0; 1g, where zero represents no and one represents yes. The issues of fact
are whether the invention is (1) a patentable subject matter (i.e., a process, machine,
article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any improvement thereof), (2) novel,
(3) nonobvious, and (4) useful. For each issue i, the set of ndings is i = f0; 1g,
where again zero represents no and one represents yes. Accordingly, the fact space is
 = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g, and one example fact pattern is  = (1; 1; 0; 1).
A case involving question q is a triple c = (; ; y), where  2 ,  2 K, and y 2 Y.
Dene x = (; ) as the inputs of the case and y as the outcome of the case. The set
of all possible cases involving question q is C = (  K) Y. I assume throughout the
paper that the inputs and outcomes of cases are or may be represented by real variables:
  Rn, K  R, and Y  R.
At time t, a court is presented with question q and a body of evidence. Based on the
evidence, the court makes ndings of fact t 2 . The court has access to a q-relevant
case history Ct = (c1; :::; ct 1), where cj = (xj ; yj) 2 C is a prior case involving question
q. How the court reaches its conclusion yt depends on its method of legal reasoning.
Under ALR, the outcome of the case at hand is a function of the inputs of the case at
hand as well as the history of prior cases, yt = Y (xt; Ct).12
2.2 ALR Model
I model ALR as similarity-weighted averaging of prior outcomes. Formally:
yt = Y (xt; Ct) =
X
j<t
 
s(xj ; xt)P
j<t s(xj ; xt)
!
yj ; (1)
where s : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R++ is a function that indexes the similarity between the inputs
xj of the prior case and the inputs xt of the case at hand. Equation (1) posits that the
outcome yt in the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes y1; :::; yt 1 of prior
12Contrast this with RLR, under which the outcome of the case at hand is a function of the inputs
only, yt = Y (xt).
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cases. The weight placed on the outcome yj of a prior case depends on the degree to
which the inputs xj of the prior case are similar to the inputs xt of the case at hand.
The degree of input similarity is given by s. The greater is the input similarity s of a
prior case, the greater is the weight given to the outcome yj of the prior case in the
determination of the outcome yt of the case at hand. Hence, I interpret s as measuring
the precedential inuence of a prior case on the case at hand.
I assume that input similarity s and, therefore, precedential inuence is an expo-
nentially decaying function of the distance  from the inputs xj of the prior case to the
inputs xt of the case at hand:
s(xj ; xt) = exp( (xj ; xt)); (2)
where  : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R+ with (xj ; xt) = 0 only if xj = xt. The assumption that
inuence decays exponentially with distance seems natural and appears in other contexts.
For instance, Shepard (1987) derives a law of psychological generalization in which the
probability of generalizing a response from one stimulus to another decays exponentially
with the distance between the stimuli in psychological space. White (2001) argues that
both theory and evidence support exponential decay of memory with distance in time
(scaled as
p
t). And Glaeser et al. (2003) introduce a model of socially inuenced behavior
in which social inuence decays exponentially with social distance. Whats more, Billot
et al. (2008) provide an axiomatic justication for specifying an exponential similarity
function in the present context (similarity-weighting averaging as a model of reasoning).13
Next, I assume that input distance  is a proportional function, with proportionality
factor v, of the weighted Euclidean distance d between the facts j of the prior case and
the facts t of the case at hand:
(xj ; xt) = v(xj ; xt)d(j ; t); (3)
where v : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R++ captures the precedential authority of the prior case
relative to the case at hand and d : RnRn ! R+, which captures the fact similarity of
the prior case relative to the case at hand, is given by
d(j ; t) =
vuut nX
i=1
!i(ji   ti)2; !i > 0 for all i. (4)
13More specically, Billot et al. (2008) provided an axiomatization of an exponential similarity function
based on a metric induced by norm. The key axiom for the exponential form is ray shift invarance, which
requires that if the facts of all prior cases lie along a ray emanating from the facts of the case at hand,
then an equal shift along this ray of the facts of all prior cases does not change the outcome of the case
at hand.
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Note that the weights !1; :::; !n in the weighted Euclidean distance d reect the rela-
tive importance of the n issues of fact that the court must resolve in order to reach a
conclusion with respect to the legal question at issue.
In specifying v, I am guided by three criteria. First, all else equal, prior cases decided
by inferior courts should have less inuence than prior cases decided by superior courts.
At the same time, prior cases decided by coequal courts should have no less inuence
than prior cases decided by inferior courts and no more inuence than prior cases decided
by superior courts. Second, the inuence penalty (resp. bonus) for prior cases decided
by inferior (resp. superior) courts should diminish as the distance in fact space to the
case at hand becomes large. This is motivated by the notion that the lesser is the factual
similarity of a prior case (i.e., the greater is d), the less important is relative position
of the deciding court in the judicial hierarchy. Third, the input distance  = vd should
satisfy all the properties of a metric, apart from symmetry. As stated previously, the key
innovation of the ALR model, and the papers main contribution, is the asymmetry of
the similarity function. This is accomplished by relaxing the symmetry of the distance
measure on which the similarity function is based. However, it is neither necessary nor
proper to relax any of the other properties. Hence, the specication of v should preserve
these other properties, including the triangle inequality.14
Guided by these criteria, I assume that v is given by
v(xj ; xt) = sec jt + tan jt; (5)
where
jt = arctan

(t   j)
d(j ; t)

;   0:
Below I show that with v specied by equation (5), the ALR model satises the rst
and second criteria set forth above. Moreover, in the Appendix I prove that the third
criterion is satised as well.
Before proceeding, however, I want to supplement the instrumental motivation for v
with a geometric motivation. To draw an analogy between a prior case and the case at
hand, a court has to traverse (metaphorically) the distance in input space from the prior
case to the case at hand. The greater is this distance, the more strained is the analogy.
14The third criterion rules out many otherwise desirable specications of v. For instance, a simple way
to impose asymmetry would be to dene v as follows:
v(xj ; xt) =

1 if j > t
 if j  t ;   1
(cf. Lieberman 2012; Argenziano and Gilboa 2012). Under this specication of v, however,  = vd
generally does not satisfy the triangle inequality on Rn+1 (n > 0).
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In input space (or fact-authority space), jt is direction from the prior case (the origin)
to the case at hand, where the distance in fact space is given by d(j ; t), the distance
in authority space is given by (t   j), and the radial distance is given by
f(xj ; xt) =
q
(d(j ; t))
2 + ((t   j))2
(see Figure 1). Note that sec jt = f(xj ; xt)=d(j ; t) and tan jt = (t  j)=d(j ; t).
It follows that
(xj ; xt) = v(xj ; xt)d(j ; t) = f(xj ; xt) + (t   j):
That is, input distance equals radial distance plus an adjustment that takes into account
both the direction and distance in authority space. The adjustment is positive if the
prior case has inferior authority (j < t) and negative if the prior case has superior
authority (j > t). It is harder to travel uphill than downhill. If the prior case has
coequal authority (j = t), there is no adjustment and  = d. The court only has to
overcome any factual dissimilarity to draw the analogy.15
Figure 2 provides a visualization of v. Observe that v = 1 if  = 0. Thus,  = 0
implies that precedential inuence is symmetric, depending only on fact similarity and
not on precedential authority. However, if  > 0, then v > 1 if the prior case has inferior
authority (j < t), v = 1 if the prior case has coequal authority (j = t), and v < 1 if
the prior case has superior authority (j > t). Hence,  > 0 begets inuence penalties
and bonuses for prior cases with inferior and superior authority, respectively, and thus
implies that precedential inuence is asymmetric.
Figure 3 displays the relationship in the ALR model between precedential inuence
(s), fact similarity (d), and precedential authority (v).16 The precedential inuence of
a prior case is greatest when the facts of the prior case are identical to the facts of the
case at hand (j = t , d = 0), and it decays exponentially at rate v as fact similarity
decreases (i.e., as d increases). Both the precedential inuence at d = 0 and the rate of
decay for d > 0 di¤er depending on the precedential authority of the prior case. If the
prior case was decided by a superior court (j > t), the precedential inuence at d = 0 is
the highest possible (s = 1) and the rate of decay for d > 0 is the lowest possible (v < 1).
15 In Teitelbaum (2013), I provide an axiomatic motivation for v. In brief, I show that the input
distance  = vd is a quasimetric induced by a skewed norm. A skewed norm is a positive denite
function F (N; p)(x) = N(x)   hp; xi, where N is a norm on Rn, p 2 Rn, and h; i denotes the scalar
product (Plastria 1992). I then provide a "skewness" axiom that, when imposed in lieu of the symmetry
axiom in the main result of Billot et al. (2008), characterizes an exponential similarity function based
on a skewed norm. The skewness axiom essentially postulates exponential discounting of the inuence
of prior cases with inferior authority relative to equidistant prior cases with superior authority.
16Note that fact similarity and precedential authority are negatively related to d and v, respectively.
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If the prior case was decided by a coequal court (j = t), the precedential inuence at
d = 0 is equally high (s = 1) but the rate of decay for d > 0 is higher (v = 1). If the
prior case was decided by an inferior court (j < t), the precedential inuence at d = 0
is lower (s < 1) and the rate of decay for d > 0 is even higher (v > 1). All else equal
(namely, d), therefore, the inuence of prior cases with inferior authority is less than
the inuence of prior cases with superior authority, and the inuence of prior cases with
coequal authority is greater than the inuence of prior cases with inferior authority and
not less than the inuence of prior cases with superior authority. Moreover, the size of
the inuence penalty (resp. bonus) for prior cases with inferior (resp. superior) authority
increases with the degree of fact similarity (i.e., as d increases) at a rate determined by
(and positively related to) the parameter .
Importantly, Figure 3 illustrates that with v specied by equation (5), the ALR model
satises the rst and second criteria set forth above. In the Appendix, I prove that the
third criterion is satised as well. That is, I prove that  = vd is a quasimetric, i.e., a
function that satises the properties of a metric, apart from symmetry.
3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I take the ALR model to data. After describing the data, I embed the
ALR model in a statistical model and assess whether it is a plausible model for the data.
I then estimate the ALR model by maximum likelihood and test the null hypothesis that
the similarity function is symmetric (i.e.,  = 0) against the alternative hypothesis that
it is asymmetric (i.e.,  > 0).
3.1 Data
The data comprise the time series of reported decisions by federal courts in U.S. maritime
salvage cases. Under U.S. maritime law, a salvor of imperiled maritime property on
navigable waters is entitled to a monetary award from the owner.17 There are two forms
of maritime salvage: "contract" salvage and "pure" salvage. Contract salvage is rendered
pursuant to a prior agreement. Pure salvage is rendered voluntarily in the absence of a
contract. The data include only pure salvage cases.
In the United States, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in pure salvage
cases. There are three elements of a valid pure salvage claim: (i) a marine peril; (ii) ser-
vice voluntarily rendered; and (iii) success in whole or in part. In the case of a valid
pure salvage claim, the court determines the award according to six factors enumerated
17The following is a bare bones description of U.S. maritime salvage law. For more detailed overviews,
see, e.g., Force (2004) or Schoenbaum (2011, ch. 16).
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by the Supreme Court in The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1 (1869): (1) the labor expended by
the salvors in rendering the salvage service; (2) the promptitude, skill, and energy dis-
played in rendering the service and saving the property; (3) the value of the property
employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to which such prop-
erty was exposed; (4) the risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the
impending peril; (5) the value of the property saved; and (6) the degree of danger from
which the property was rescued. The law of salvage provides no precise formula or rule
for computing a salvage award on the basis of the Blackwall factors. The court has broad
discretion in fashioning the award based on its ndings with respect to the Blackwall
factors, though it is bound to apply all of the Blackwall factors and the award generally
may not exceed the value of the property saved.
There are several reasons why I selected maritime salvage cases for the empirical
analysis. First, the outcome (the salvage award) is a continuous variable (a dollar
amount) and the inputs (the Blackwall factors) are well dened and stable over time.18
Second, awards in maritime salvage cases arguably are apolitical legal questions. More-
over, it is hard to imagine that a maritime salvage case is an opportunity for a federal
judge to advance strategic goals such as career advancement. Thus, if there is any set-
ting in which we should expect a legalist model of judicial behavior to be operative (and
other models such as attitudinal or strategic models to be inoperative), it is maritime
salvage cases. Third, the law of maritime salvage is federal law, and federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving claims for salvage awards. Accordingly, state
variation in law or courts is not an issue. Fourth, it seems reasonable to treat the federal
courts as a single adjudicative body for purposes of maritime salvage cases: there is no
split among the circuits (The Blackwall is controlling precedent for all circuits); there
are no specialty courts for maritime cases; and it generally is believed that federal courts
are reasonably uniform in quality. Lastly, although the criteria for determining a mar-
itime salvage award are well dened and stable through time, the law provides no precise
formula or rule. This leaves open the possibility that courts are engaging in ALR.
The data comprise 684 pure salvage cases from 1799 to 2007. The cases were identied
using seven search methods. The rst search method was "KeyCiting" and "Shepardiz-
ing" The Blackwall in Westlaw and LexisNexis, respectively. The second search method
was performing keyword searches in three databases: Westlaws Federal Maritime Law
Cases (FMRT-CS); LexisAdmiralty Cases, Federal and State (MEGA); and Ameri-
can Maritime Cases (AMC), which is available on Westlaw and Lexis. The third search
18 In the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Blackwall factors "have weathered
the storms of the past century." Saint Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 505 F.2d 1115
(9th Cir. 1974).
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method was consulting the salvage digests in Wests federal digest. The fourth search
method was consulting the salvage award tables in the quinquennial digests of American
Maritime Cases. The fth search method was consulting leading treatises on admiralty
and maritime law. The sixth search method was consulting early American digests and
reporters. The nal search method was examining each case, however identied, for two
purposes: (i) nd additional cases cited therewithin and (ii) cull cases that, upon closer
inspection, did not apply the Blackwall factors to determine an award for pure salvage.19
For each case, the data record the date of the decision, the court,20 the award (in 1980
U.S. dollars), and the courts nding on each Blackwall factor. The position of the court
in the judicial hierarchy is coded as follows: district court = 0, circuit court = 1, and
Supreme Court = 2. The Blackwall factors (other than the value of the property saved)
are coded as binary variables: low = 0 or high = 1. This is for two reasons. The rst
reason is that courts routinely characterize salvage operations as "high order" or "low
order." The second reason is that binary coding minimizes subjectivity and, therefore,
disagreement/error. The value of the property saved is recorded in 1980 U.S. dollars.21
Of the 684 cases, 545 cases (79.7 percent) were decided by district courts, 134 cases
(19.6 percent) were decided by circuit courts, and ve cases (0.7 percent) were decided
by the Supreme Court. Table 1 displays summary statistics for the award and the six
Blackwall factors. For instance, it shows that the awards range from $240 to $1,866,000,
with a mean award of $74,000; the value of the property saved ranges from $1,200 to
$42,133,000, with a mean value of $1,386,000; and the labor expended by the salvors
was high in 39 percent of the cases.22 Table 2 displays the mean award conditional on
di¤erent ndings on the Blackwall factors. For instance, it shows that the mean award
for cases in which the labor expended by the salvors was low is $36,000, whereas the
mean award for cases in which the labor expended by the salvors was high is $134,000.
19These searches yielded 881 pure salvage cases from 1779 to 2007. Of these cases, 197 were excluded
from the nal data set because they were missing either a clear statement of the salvage award or clear
ndings with respect to one or more of the Blackwall factors.
20The court is the court of nal adjudication, and the data record the award and ndings of fact as
determined by the court of nal adjudication.
21The following procedures were followed in coding the cases. After receiving instructions from me, a
research assistant read every case and hand coded every variable. In addition, I met regularly with the
research assistant to review his progress and discuss any coding issues or questions. Finally, I audited
his work by independently reading and shadow coding 15 percent of the cases. Our disagreement rate
was zero with respect to the awards and less than one percent with respect to the Blackwall factors.
22Though not shown in the table, it is worth noting that the award percentage (the salvage award
expressed as a fraction of the value of the property saved) ranges from less than one percent to 85 percent,
with a mean of 14 percent.
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3.2 Statistical ALR Model
The rst step of the empirical analysis is to embed the ALR model in a statistical model.
Following Gilboa et al. (2006) and its progeny,23 I assume y1 = "1 and
yt =
X
j<t
 
s(xj ; xt; 
)P
j<t s(xj ; xt; 
)
!
yj + "t; t = 2; :::; T; (6)
where "t
iid N  0; 2 for t = 1; :::; T . (Note that I include 
  (!1; :::; !n) in (6) to
make explicit the dependence of s on the weights !1; :::; !n in the weighted Euclidean
distance d on which s is based.) Model (6) posits that the outcome yt of the case at hand
is normally distributed around a similarity-weighted average of the outcomes y1; :::; yt 1
of prior cases. To highlight two key properties of the model, rewrite (6) as
yt = (1;t)yt 1 + (2;t)yt 2 +   + (t 1;t)y1 + "t; (7)
where i;t = s (xt i; xt) =
P
i<t s (xi; xt). From (7), we can see that (i) model (6) is an
autoregressive process of order (t   1) and (ii) because the i;ts sum to one for each t,
the process has a unit root (Lieberman 2010).
Before proceeding to the next step of the empirical analysis, let me say a few words
about the relationship between model (6) and kernel regression.24 Kernel regression
assumes a data generating process of the form
yt = g(xt) + t; t = 1; :::; T; (8)
where i
iid  0; 2 and g is an unknown function. A standard estimator for g is the
Nadaraya-Watson estimator
g^(xt) =
TX
j=1
 
K(xt   xj ;H)PT
j=1K (xt   xj ;H)
!
yi;
where K is a kernel function and H is a diagonal matrix of bandwidth parameters
h1; :::; hn. Note the connection between (6) and (8). Each generates a new/predicted
value of y by taking a weighted average of the observed values of y where the weights
are a function the distance between the new/hypothesized x and the observed values of
x. Notwithstanding this connection, however, there is an important distinction between
23See, e.g., Gayer et al. (2007), Lieberman (2010), and Gilboa et al. (2011).
24On kernel regression, see, e.g., Pagan and Ullah (1999). My comments below echo the comments
by Gilboa et al. (2011) on the relationship between the empirical similarity model and kernel regression.
For more on this relationship, see Gilboa et al. (2006, 2011) and Lieberman (2010).
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(6) and kernel regression. Kernel regression is a statistical technique that uses weighted
averaging to estimate (8), which assumes that the data are generated by an unknown
function g, whereas (6) assumes that that the data are generated by weighted averaging.
In other words, (8) species a rule relating xt to yt, and thus assumes that the distribution
of yt depends only on xt, whereas (6) assumes that the distribution of yt depends not
only on xt but also on the history of prior cases, Ct = f(xj ; yj) : j < tg.
3.3 Plausibility of ALR Model
The next step of the empirical analysis is to assess whether the ALR model is a plausible
model for the data. I focus on the two key properties of the model highlighted above:
(i) model (6) is an autoregressive process and (ii) the process has a unit root.
To investigate whether an autoregressive process could have generated the data, I
estimate a linear regression model and test for autocorrelation in the residuals. Because
salvage awards are bounded below by zero and skewed to the right,25 the dependent
variable is the log-transformed award. The regressors comprise a constant and the six
Blackwall factors, where the value of the property saved is log-transformed.26 The model
is estimated by ordinary least squares.
I test for autocorrelation in the residuals using the Ljung-Box test and the Runs test.
The Ljung-Box test is a portmanteau test which considers the null hypothesis that the
residuals are not autocorrelated against the alternative hypothesis of an autoregressive
process of order p.27 The test statistic is Q = T (T +2)
Pp
j=1 
2
j=(T  j), where j the jth
autocorrelation coe¢ cient of the residual series. Under the null hypothesis, Q is asymp-
totically distributed 2(p). The Runs test is a nonparametric test that considers the null
hypothesis that the residual process is random against the alternative of a nonrandom
process.28 The test counts the number of runs r above and below zero and compares
it to the expected number of runs r. Under the null hypothesis, r = (2n0n1=T ) + 1,
where n0 and n1 are the number of values above and below zero, respectively. The test
statistic is Z = (r   r)=sr, where sr =
p
2n0n1(2n0n1   T )=T 2(T   1). Under the null
hypothesis, Z is approximately distributed N(0; 1).
The results of both tests are reported in Table 3. For the Ljung-Box test, results are
presented for six and twenty lags, which correspond to the values suggested by Box et al.
25More than 72 percent of the awards are less than the mean award ($74,000).
26The log-transformation of the value of the property saved is not an arbitrarily imposed assumption;
rather, it is the specication selected by the multivariable fractional polynomial procedure of Sauerbrei
and Royston (1999). For details, see the Appendix.
27The Ljung-Box test was proposed by Ljung and Box (1978). For a textbook treatment, see, e.g.,
Johnston and DiNardo (1997).
28For a textbook treatment of the Runs test, see, e.g., Bradley (1968, ch. 11).
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(1994) (who suggest minf20; T   1g) and Tsay (2005) (who suggests lnT ), respectively,
and also for forty lags. In each test, the null hypothesis is rejected at the ve percent
level, suggesting that the data are consistent with an autoregressive process.
To investigate whether the data generating process has a unit root, I employ the ADF-
GLS test proposed by Elliott et al. (1996). The ADF-GLS test is an augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test in which the time series is detrended via generalized least squares
(GLS).29 The ADF-GLS test is "nearly e¢ cient" in the sense that its asymptotic local
power functions are virtually indistinguishable from the Gaussian power envelope, and
has greater power than the standard ADF test (which is not "nearly e¢ cient") (Haldrup
and Jansson 2006). The test proceeds in two steps. First, it estimates  in the regression
yt   yt 1 = (1  ) + vt, where  = 1  7=T . Second, it estimates  in the regression
eyt = eyt 1+Ppj=1 jeyt j+ut, whereeyt = eyt eyt 1, eyt = yt b, and b is the estimate
of  obtained in the rst step. The test statistic is the ordinary t statistic for  = 0. The
results of ADF-GLS test are reported in Table 3. Results are presented for forty lags,
which corresponds to the value suggested by both the sequential t criterion proposed by
Ng and Perron (1995) and the modied Akaike information criterion (MAIC) proposed
by Ng and Perron (2000). The test fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at
the ve percent level, suggesting that the data are consistent with a unit root process.
Of course, the results of the autocorrelation and unit root tests reported in Table 3
provide only indirect, negative assurance that the ALR model is a plausible model for
the data. The autocorrelation tests reject the null hypothesis that the residuals from
the linear regression model are not autocorrelated, and the unit root test fails to reject
the null hypothesis that the data generating process has a unit root. These results are
consistent with a data generating process that is autoregressive and has a unit root, but
they do not a¢ rmatively establish that the data were generated by such a process, let
alone by the ALR model. Indeed, it is important to highlight two limitations of the
analysis. First, the Ljung-Box test and the ADF-GLS test contemplate a xed order
autoregressive process,30 and thus can provide only oblique evidence with respect to the
ALR model, which is an autoregressive process of increasing order.31 Second, although
the ADF-GLS test is "nearly e¢ cient" and has greater power than the standard ADF
test, it has low power in the present context. To get a sense of the tests power, I
performed 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations in which I rst generated simulated data under
the alternative hypothesis that the data generating process is the linear regression model
29For a textbook treatment, see, e.g., Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, ch. 14).
30More specically, the Ljung-Box test tests against the alternative hypothesis of a pth order autore-
gressive process, and the ADF-GLS test tests for a unit root in a pth order autoregressive process.
31 I am not aware of any autocorrelation or unit root tests that contemplate an increasing order au-
toregressive process.
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estimated above and then tested for a unit root using the ADF-GLS test.32 At the ve
percent level, the test correctly rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root 195 times out
of 1,000, implying a power of 19.5 percent.
That said, the Runs test is more generally applicable, as it is nonparametric and
makes no assumptions about the data generating process. Indeed, not only does the
Runs test on the residuals of the linear regression model reject the null hypothesis of
randomness, which provides negative assurance on the plausibility of the ALR model,
but a Runs test on the residuals of the tted ALR model (see Section 3.4) fails to reject
the null hypothesis of randomness, which provides positive assurance.33
3.4 Testing the Symmetry of the Similarity Function
The nal step of the empirical analysis is to estimate the model by maximum likelihood
and test the hypothesis  = 0 against the alternative  > 0, i.e., test the hypothesis that
the similarity function s is symmetric against the alternative that s is asymmetric. As
stated previously, this is the crucial step, as the key innovation of the ALR model, and
the papers main contribution, is the asymmetry of the similarity function.
The loglikelihood function is
l () =  T
2
ln (2)  T
2
ln
 
2
  y0S0Sy
22
;
where  = (; !1; :::; !n; 2) is the vector of model parameters, y = [y1    yT ]0, and
S
(TT )
=
2666666664
1 0 0    0
 1 1 0    0
  s(x1;x3)P
j<3 s(xj ;x3)
  s(x1;x3)P
j<3 s(xj ;x3)
1    0
...
...
...
. . .
...
  s(x1;xT )P
j<T s(xj ;xT )
  s(x2;xT )P
j<T s(xj ;xT )
     s(xT 1;xT )P
j<T s(xj ;xT )
1
3777777775
:
Recall that  is the shape parameter for the precedential authority function v dened in
equation (5), !1; :::; !n are the weights in the Euclidean distance function d dened in
equation (4), and 2 is the variance of the error term "t in equation (6). For the derivation
32To generate each simulated data set, I performed two steps. First, I sampled 684 residuals from a
normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation set equal to the root mean squared error
of the residuals from the linear regression model estimated above. Second, I used the tted regression
line and the simulated residuals to generate 684 simulated awards, one for each observation in the data.
To select the number of lags for each ADF-GLS test, I took the greater of (i) the value suggested by the
sequestial t criterion and (ii) the value suggested by the MAIC.
33The test statistic is  1:543, whereas the ve percent critical value is  1:645.
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of the loglikelihood function, as well as an explication of the asymptotic theory of model
(6), which establishes a theoretical basis for simple hypothesis tests involving the model
parameters, see Lieberman (2010).
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the model parameters. Note
that in the estimation both the award (y) and the value of the property saved (x5)
are log-transformed. The estimates for !1; :::; !6 suggest that each of the Blackwall
factors, save only the skill displayed by the salvors (x2), is statistically signicant to
the determination of the award. They also suggest that the factors which receive the
greatest weight are the labor expended by the salvors (x1), the value of the property
saved (x5), and the danger to the property saved (x6), and that the factors which receive
the least weight are the skill displayed by the salvors (x2), the danger to the salvors
property (x3), and the risk incurred by the salvors (x4). In addition, the estimate for 2
suggests that unobserved heterogeneity in salvage awards has unit variance.
Most importantly, the estimate for  is 0:036 with a standard error of 0:017, and
the hypothesis  = 0 is rejected in favor of the alternative  > 0 at the one percent
level. That is, I nd that the similarity function is asymmetric, with signicant inuence
penalties and bonuses for cases decided by inferior and superior courts, respectively (see
Figure 4). The implication is that precedential authority, and not just fact similarity,
matters for precedential inuence. All else equal, the precedential inuence of a prior case
that was decided by an inferior court is signicantly less than the precedential inuence
of a prior case that was decided by a coequal court, which in turn is signicantly less
than the precedential inuence of a prior case that was decided by a superior court.
4 Discussion
The use of analogical reasoning in law is a central topic in the jurisprudence and articial
intelligence and law literatures. Contributing to these literatures, this paper presents a
formal model of analogical legal reasoning and takes the model to data. The ALR model
posits that the outcome of the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior
cases, where the weights are a function of the fact similarity and precedential authority
of the prior cases. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that the ALR model
is a plausible model for the time series of reported decisions by federal courts in U.S.
maritime salvage cases. Whats more, the results indicate that the similarity function
is asymmetric, a¢ rming that precedential inuence indeed depends not only on fact
similarity, which is symmetric, but also on precedential authority, which is not.
The ALR model and the empirical analysis, however, are subject to several important
limitations. First, the ALRmodel is a stylized representation of analogical legal reasoning
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in its purest form the judge reasons directly from case to case without invoking a
governing legal rule. A model that combines elements of analogical and rule-based legal
reasoning may be more realistic. In future research, it would be interesting to explore a
hybrid ALR-RLR model, perhaps along the lines of a mixed SAR model (Anselin 1988).
Second, the ALR model species a particular method of assessment (similarity-
weighted averaging of all prior cases), as well as a specic notion of similarity (exponen-
tially decaying function of asymmetric weighted Euclidean distance). Although I would
argue that any model of ALR must involve some similarity-weighted statistic of the out-
comes of prior cases, statistics other than the mean e.g., the median or the mode are
plausible alternatives. Another plausible alternative is a similarity-weighted statistic of
selected prior cases (as opposed to all prior cases) e.g., the k-nearest cases.34 Further-
more, one could specify other similarity functions (e.g., s = 1=(1+)),35 other preceden-
tial authority functions,36 or other distance functions (e.g., d(a; b) =
Pn
i=1 !ijai  bij).37
Third, the ALR model takes a representative agent approach and assumes that all
judges are equipped with the same similarity function. Allowing for heterogeneous judges
surely would be more realistic. However, tractability would require making strong as-
sumptions about the structure of such heterogeneity.
Fourth, the empirical analysis relies on data that records the inputs and outcomes
of legal cases. Such data can provide only indirect evidence regarding the method of
legal reasoning.38 Nevertheless, it arguably is the best available evidence. In many
cases, a courts written opinion o¤ers no direct evidence regarding the method of legal
reasoning. Even in cases in which the courts opinion o¤ers some direct evidence, it
rarely is denitive and, in any event, it arguably is of little probative value.39
Lastly, the empirical analysis speaks only to whether the ALR model is a plausible
model for the time series of outcomes in U.S. maritime salvage cases. It says nothing
34A prior study that uses nearest neighbor methods for predicting judicial decisions is Mackaay and
Robillard (1974).
35This specication of s, which exhibits subexponential decay, was suggested by Gilboa et al. (2006)
and used by Gayer et al. (2007) in a study of case-based reasoning about real estate prices.
36For instance, Hodgson et al. (1987) and Drezner and Wesolowsky (1989) suggest other quasimetrics
from which one could derive alternative specications for v.
37This specication of d is the weighted L1 distance. The L1 distance is also known as the Manhattan
distance or the the taxicab metric.
38Moreover, although the coding scheme was guided by doctrinal considerations and the coding proce-
dures were designed to minimize disagreement/error, one can always quible with the way that legal cases
are coded in any study (or even argue that the enterprise of coding legal cases is inherently awed).
39"As a rule, we conceive of the judges writing of an opinion as a procedure in which he justies his
decision. The writing coincides neither necessarily nor realistically with the process by which he reaches
his decision, the process of discovery" (Murray 1982). There are (at least) two reasons to think that a
court might use the language of RLR to justify its decision even if it engages in ALR in reaching its
decision. First, "the language of rules is much more e¢ cient and parsimonious than that of cases"
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 2000). Second, "[r]ules are excellent justication mechanisms" (Hunter 2001).
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about whether it is a plausible model for case outcomes in other areas of law.40 Further-
more, the fact the ALR model is a legalist model of judicial behavior suggests that it
may not be well suited to other areas of law, including, in particular, politically charged
areas (to which we might expect attitudinal or strategic models to be better suited).41
All of that said, I believe that taking a formal modeling approach to ALR helps
sharpen ideas not just about ALR but also about RLR, and suggests ways to distinguish
them theoretically. For instance, the model of the legal environment in Section 2.1
suggests a way to theoretically distinguish ALR and RLR: under ALR the outcome of the
case at hand is a function of the inputs of the case at hand as well as the history of prior
cases, yt = Y (xt; Ct), whereas under RLR the outcome of the case at hand is a function of
the inputs only, yt = Y (xt). Stated another way, under RLR the outcome depends on a
bounded number of parameters, whereas under ALR the number of parameters increases
with the prior case history (cf. Gayer et al. 2007). In addition, the mathematical kinship
between the ALR model and kernel regression highlighted in Section 3.2 suggests a
theoretical connection between ALR and RLR: under ALR, although the judge "does
not explicitly resort to general rules and theories," she "can be viewed as someone who
believes in a general rule of the form Y = f(X1; :::; Xm) but does not know the functional
form of f and therefore attempts to estimate it by nonparametric techniques" (Gilboa
et al. 2006). It also suggests a theoretical distinction: ALR posits that the data are
generated by weighted averaging, whereas RLR posits that the data are generated by a
rule and uses weighted averaging as a statistical technique to estimate the rule. In future
research, it would be valuable to explore whether these connections and distinctions could
be leveraged to develop a way to empirically distinguish ALR and RLR.
40 In future research, it would be interesting to take the ALR model to data on case outcomes in other
areas of law. One area in which potentially suitable data already have been collected is U.S. criminal
confession cases. See Benesh (2002) and Kastellec (2010).
41 In future research, it would be interesting to probe the extent to which non-legalist theories of judicial
behavior could be formalized using statistical models. For example, I believe one could protably model
an attitudinalist judge as a Bayesian nonparametric statistician.
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Appendix
A Proof that  is a quasimetric
Here I prove that the input distance function  : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R+, on which the
similarity function s : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R++ is based, is a quasimetric on Rn+1.
Recall the denition of a quasimetric (Wilson 1931):
Denition 1 A function  : Rn Rn ! Rn is a quasimetric on Rn if for all x; y 2 Rn:
(i) (x; y)  0;
(ii) (x; y) = 0 if and only if x = y;
(iii) (x; z)  (x; y) + (y; z) for any z 2 Rn (triangle inequality).
Note that a metric is a quasimetric that also satises symmetry: (x; y) = (y; x). A
quasimetric is not necessarily symmetric, i.e., in general (x; y) 6= (y; x).
Theorem 1 For all j ; t 2 Rn and j ; t 2 R, with xj = (j ; j) and xt = (t; t), let
(xj ; xt) = v(xj ; xt)d(j ; t);
where
v(xj ; xt) = sec jt + tan jt;
jt = arctan

(t   j)
d(j ; t)

;   0;
and d is a metric on Rn. Then  is a quasimetric on Rn+1.
Proof. Recall from Section 2.2 that
(xj ; xt) = v(xj ; xt)d(j ; t) = f(xj ; xt) + (t   j);
where
f(xj ; xt) =
q
(d(j ; t))
2 + ((t   j))2:
Observe that f is a metric on Rn+1. Specically, it is the weighted Euclidean metric.
(i) Observe that f(xj ; xt)  j(t   j)j  0. It follows that (xj ; xt)  0.
(ii) If xj = xt then f(xj ; xt) = 0 and (t   j) = 0, and hence (xj ; xt) = 0. Now
suppose (xj ; xt) = 0 but xj 6= xt. If xj 6= xt then f(xj ; xt) > 0 and (t   j) 6= 0.
However, because f(xj ; xt)  j(t   j)j, this implies (xj ; xt) > 0, which contradicts
(xj ; xt) = 0.
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(iii) Take any x 2 Rn+1. To prove that  satises the triangle inequality, we must
show that (xj ; xt)  (xj ; x) + (x; xt). The condition holds if and only if
f(xj ; xt)  f(xj ; x) + f(x; xt)
+(  j) + (t   )  (t   j):
Observe that (  j) + (t   )  (t   j) = 0. Observe further that
f(xj ; xt)  f(xj ; x) + f(x; xt)
holds because f is a metric on Rn+1. Hence, the condition holds.
B Selection of lnx5 by multivariable fractional polynomial regression
As stated in footnote 26, the log-transformation of the value of the property saved (x5) is
the specication selected by the multivariable fractional polynomial (MFP) procedure of
Sauerbrei and Royston (1999).42 The following is a brief summary of the MFP procedure.
For a textbook treatment, see Royston and Altman (1994, ch. 6).
The standard MFP regression model may be expressed as
yt = Y (xt; ) = b0 +
hX
i=1
bixit +
nX
i=h+1
mX
j=1
bijx
(pj)
it + "t; t = 1; :::; T;
where "t
iid N  0; 2 and  = (b0; b1; :::; bh; bh+1;1; :::; bh+1;m; :::; bn1; :::; bnm; 2). The
rst h covariates, x1; :::; xh, are binary, categorical, or ordinal, and the remaining covari-
ates, xh+1; :::; xn, are continuous. The round bracket notation signies the Box-Tidwell
transformation,
x
(pj)
it =
(
x
pj
it for pj 6= 0
lnxit for pj = 0
:
The MFP algorithm selects the covariates and the powers p1; :::; pm for the continuous
covariates. The researcher predenes the set of potential covariates, the set of potential
powers, denoted P, and the maximum degree of the fractional polynomial, denoted M .
The researcher also predenes two signicance levels: 1, which determines the critical
value for variable selection; and 2, which determines the critical value for power selec-
tion. The covariates are selected using a backward elimination procedure in which the
potential covariates are iteratively removed and added based a sequence of signicance
42A fractional polynomial is an extension of a conventional polynomial that allows for noninteger and
negative powers.
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tests at level 1. The powers are selected using a closed test procedure in which an M
degree fractional polynomial is tested at level 2 against a linear model and then, if and
as necessary, against increasingly complex fractional polynomials. Once the covariates
and powers are selected, the parameter vector  is estimated by maximum likelihood.
To select the specication for the value of the property saved (x5), which is the only
continuous covariate, I ran an MFP regression in which the dependent variable is the log-
transformed salvage award, the set of potential covariates comprises the six Blackwall
factors, the set of potential powers is P = f 4; 3; 2; 1; 12 ; 0; 12 ; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8g,
the maximum degree of the fractional polynomial is M = 5, the signicance level for
covariate selection is 1 = 1, and the signicance level for power selection is 2 = 0:05.
Note that setting 1 = 1 forces the MFP algorithm to select all the covariates into the
model, which is justied here by the doctrinal principle that courts are bound to apply
all of the Blackwall factors in determining salvage awards. Although the model allows
for a ve-degree fractional polynomial in x5 with powers ranging from  4 to 8, the MFP
algorithm selects a one-degree fractional polynomial with power zero, which corresponds
to a simple log transformation. For further details, see Teitelbaum (forthcoming).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean deviation Minimum Maximum
y Salvage award 74.44 153.35 0.24 1,865
x1 Labor expended by salvors 0.39 0.49 0 1
x2 Skill displayed by salvors 0.44 0.50 0 1
x3 Danger to salvorsproperty 0.27 0.45 0 1
x4 Risk to salvors 0.18 0.39 0 1
x5 Value of property saved 1,385.71 2,913.98 1.20 42,133
x6 Danger to property saved 0.51 0.50 0 1
Notes: 684 cases from 1799 to 2007. y and x5 in thousands of 1980 U.S. dollars.
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Table 2: Conditional Salvage Awards
Variable Cases Mean
y 684 74.44
y if x1 = 0 415 35.67
y if x1 = 1 269 134.24
y if x2 = 0 382 51.07
y if x2 = 1 302 103.99
y if x3 = 0 498 57.57
y if x3 = 1 186 119.60
y if x4 = 0 559 58.41
y if x4 = 1 125 146.09
y if x5  x5 504 37.98
y if x5 > x5 180 176.50
y if x6 = 0 337 45.18
y if x6 = 1 347 102.85
Notes: y in thousands of 1980 U.S. dollars. x5 denotes the mean of x5.
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Table 3: Autocorrelation and Unit Root Tests
Test Five percent
Test statistic critical value
Ljung-Box test:
p = 6 52:604 12:592
p = 20 119:360 31:410
p = 40 205:136 55:758
Runs test  1:817  1:645
ADF-GLS test (p = 40)  1:520  1:950
Notes: For the Runs test, the critical value reects a one-sided test against the alternative of
positive autocorrelation. For the ADF-GLS test, the critical value is interpolated from tables
presented by Elliott et al. (1996).
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Table 4: ALR Model Maximim Likelihood Estimates
Standard
Parameter Estimate error
 Shape parameter for v 0:036 0:017
!1 Weight on x1 14:822 2:602
!2 Weight on x2 0:785 0:843
!3 Weight on x3 3:419y 2:081
!4 Weight on x4 6:101 3:092
!5 Weight on lnx5 9:232 1:777
!6 Weight on x6 11:823 2:888
2 Variance of "t 1:005 0:019
Loglikelihood  974:097
Notes: Dependent variable is ln y. 684 cases from 1799 to 2007.
Signicant at the one percent level (one-tailed test).
ySignicant at the ten percent level (one-tailed test).
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